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COMMENT
From Kneecappings Toward Peace:
The Use of Intra-Community Dispute
Resolution in Northern Ireland
"The definitive renunciation of violence, without any second thoughts, will become
the sine qua non for the survival of humanity itself and for each of us."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Violence has been a way of life in Northern Ireland for many years as com-
munities were divided by separate warring paramilitary factions. 2 Each side be-
lieved that it existed for the benefit and protection of the local community against
the forces on the other side. The Irish Republican Army ("IRA") pledged itself to
the defense of Northern Irish Catholics from persecution by those loyal to the
British government. 3  Similarly, groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force
("UVF") and the Ulster Defense Association ("UDA") formed to defend Protes-
tant citizens against IRA attacks.4 Policing of local neighborhoods fell largely to
these groups.5 Enforcement of the rules created by both the IRA and Protestant
groups involved shootings, kneecappings, and occasionally tarring and feather-
ing.6
In 1996, realizing the importance of renouncing violence, both Catholic and
Protestant communities began devising systems of non-violent, community-based
justice to replace the brutal regime of kneecappings and punishment shootings.
The result of these meetings was the development of two groups: Northern Ireland
Alternatives ("NIA") in Protestant communities and Community Restorative Jus-
tice Ireland ("CRJI") in Catholic communities.8 NIA focuses much of its work on
youths accused of anti-social crimes, 9 using techniques such as victim-offender
1. RENP GIRARD, THINGS HIDDEN SINCE THE FOUNDATION OF THE WORLD,1 37 (Stephen Bann &
Michael Metteer trans., Standford University Press 1987).
2. See JOHN CONROY, BELFAST DIARY: WAR AS A WAY OF LIFE 2 (Beacon Press 1995).
3. Feargal Cochrane, Unsung Heroes? The Role of Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations in
the Northern Ireland Conflict, in NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE DIVIDED WORLD, 138 (John McGarry
ed., Oxford University Press 2001). The PIRA was formed in 1970 when it split from the Irish Repub-
lican Army, advocating more intensive military action against the British Government. Id.
4. Id.
5. See CONROY, supra note 2, at 88.
6. Id. at 85-88.
7. Brian Gormally, Community Restorative Justice in Northern Ireland, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
ONLINE (April 2006), http://www.restorativejustice.orgleditions/2006/aprilO6/gormallyarticle.
8. Id.
9. "Anti-social crime" generally refers to incidents such as vandalism, stealing and rioting. HARRY
MIKA, COMMUNITY-BASED RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 17, 25 (Institute of Crimi-
nology and Criminal Justice 2006) available at
http://atlanticphilanthropies.org/content/download/3484/52576/file/HMikaReport.pdf.
1
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mediation and reparation to the community to resolve the dispute.' 0 Similarly,
CRJI organizes meetings between victims, offenders, and local leaders in the
Catholic communities.
Several criticisms have been lodged against these groups. Critics claim that
they are little more than fronts to allow the IRA and UVF to maintain greater con-
trol over members of their communities. 12 Critics also argue that the use of these
community-based programs creates what is essentially a two-tiered justice system,
as clients of these programs may still be punished by the state legal system.
1 3
Lastly, detractors argue that these programs are not truly voluntary. 14
Despite the criticisms, the work of NIA and CRJI has significantly decreased
the number of paramilitary punishment attacks in the communities where they are
active.15 To supporters, this is evidence that these programs provide positive and
desirable alternatives to retributive violence.
16
II. PARAMILITARY POLICING
A detailed analysis of the history and causes of the troubles in Northern Irel-
and is beyond the scope of this paper. Some background information will be help-
ful, however, to understand the conflict. The beginning of the conflict can be
traced back to the early Seventeenth Century. 17 In an effort to quell the very re-
bellious colony of Ireland, the British government began a system of "plantation,"
which involved displacing the rebellious Irish natives, confiscating their land, and
turning it over to loyal English and Scots. 18 The natives in Ulster, the northern-
most and largely Catholic region in Ireland, reacted violently to being ousted from
their land by Scottish Protestants. 19
For the next 300 years, the Catholics in Ireland continuously fought for their
independence from Britain. Finally, the IRA and the British Army agreed to a
truce in December 1921, and the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed.E' Under the
terms of the treaty, the new Irish Free State acquired its own Parliament but re-
22mained a part of the British Empire. In order to appease Protestants in the
North, the treaty also created the state of Northern Ireland from six of the nine
counties of Ulster where Protestants had become a majority.23
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION NORTHERN IRELAND, COMMUNITY RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
IRELAND 3 (October 2007) available at http://www.cjini.org/InspectionReports2007Icons.htm.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See MIKA, supra note 9, at 25. The preceding study by Atlantic Philanthropies demonstrated that
CRJI prevented 82% of paramilitary punishments, while NIA prevented 71% of paramilitary punish-
ments. Id. at 34.
16. Mark Davenport, Guidelines on Justice by New Year, BBC NEWS, Oct. 5, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hii/northemireland/4312192.stm.
17. See CONROY, supra note 2, at 19.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 19-20.
20. Id. at 21.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 22-23.
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The police force of Northern Ireland, known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary
("RUC"), had little legitimacy in the Catholic communities of Northern Ireland.24
The predominantly Protestant police force had been known in some cases to turn
the other way when Protestants attacked Catholic homes. 25 Many Catholic resi-
dents distrusted the police and doubted that the police would protect them. 26 As a
result, much of the violence and crime in Catholic communities went unreported. 7
This tension between the RUC and the Catholic citizens essentially created a law
enforcement vacuum. 28 With crime and other anti-social activities going mostly
unchecked in these neighborhoods, the local citizens turned to paramilitary groups
like the IRA to step in.29 Some scholars claim that paramilitary self-policing flou-
rished because the government, indifferent to victims in working class neighbor-
hoods, chose to ignore it.
30
Government apathy, social unrest, and the citizens' misgivings about the po-
lice all contributed to an environment that was ripe for vigilante justice; the IRA
stepped in and created a series of informal "rules." These rules were spread by
word-of-mouth and wall murals; sometimes the IRA actually dropped their direc-
tives into community mail slots. 31 The rules covered a broad range of anti-social
activity and sometimes drew seemingly arbitrary lines. Robbing your neighbor
was forbidden; robbing from the government was allowed.32 Teenagers were not
allowed to steal cars or trucks unless it was necessary to make a barricade during a
riot.33 Policemen were always legitimate targets for attack; firemen, however,
could not be targeted34 Drinking was allowed, but liquor could not be sold to
minors.35 The IRA members also became de facto truant officers, ensuring that
area youths attended school.36
When the IRA decided that a rule had been broken and punishment was in
order, the IRA dispatched a punishment squad.37 The punishments used by para-
military groups varied and could include: shootings in the knee (kneecapping),
thigh, elbow, or ankle; beatings with baseball bats, iron bars, or hurling sticks;
and, in some cases, banishment from the community.38 The severity of the pu-
24. Kieran McEvoy & Harry Mika, Restorative Justice and the Critique of Informalism in Northern
Ireland, 42 BRrr. J. CRIMINOLOGY 534, 537 (Summer 2002).
25. CONROY, supra note 2, at 34.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 81.
28. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 537.
29. Id.
30. MIKA, supra note 9, Foreward.





36. Id. at 80.
37. Id. at 85.
38. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 536. In the 1970s the PIRA also used tar and feathers as a
punishment; that method was largely abandoned, however, because of the time and conspicuousness of
the act. CONROY, supra note 2, at 87.
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nishment depended on the severity of the offense. 39 Between 1973 and 1985, the
RUC reported 1,110 kneecappings.4 °
The story of a man named "Peter Murphy" offers a sad example of these pu-
nishment attacks. In 1974, Peter broke up a fight between his child and another
child.4' In the process, he swung at the other child's father, who was a member of
the IRA. Peter was taken to a cemetery, shot in the knee, and left there.43 Two
years later, Peter was accused of robbing a pub and punched his accuser."a Short-
ly thereafter, he was taken to an alley and shot in the arm.45 The severe nerve and
muscle damage to his arm left his hand permanently limp.
46
The victims of kneecappings were often too poor to do anything but return to
their neighborhood and serve as visual reminders of what happened to rule-
breakers.47 Despite the violent nature of these paramilitary attacks, local residents
viewed these forms of retribution as swift and visible ways to dispense justice.48
The communities needed to be policed by someone. If the IRA did not step in,
residents would be forced to turn to the police for help; and turning to the police
meant rejecting the IRA. 49 Therefore, as brutal as the attacks seemed, local resi-
dents viewed them as acceptable and had little pity for the victims.
50
Protestant paramilitary groups also imposed similar punishment attacks on
their local offenders, though less often than in Catholic communities. 5 The Prot-
estant paramilitary groups had a much less organized system of punishment than
the IRA, though their attacks were equally brutal; and while the Protestant pu-
nishment attacks were also used to police local civilians in the community, they
also targeted other paramilitary groups or carried out internal discipline.
52
Punishment attacks continued in both Protestant and Catholic communities
unabated for many years. Even the 1994 ceasefire declared between the IRA and
British Loyalist groups did not stop the punishment attacks. 53 The ceasefire, by its
terms, applied only to "military activities. Both sides considered the punish-
ment attacks "policing" activities, unaffected by the ceasefire. 55 It was not until
the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 that the issue of punishment attacks was
39. CONROY, supra note 2, at 85. For example, a bullet through the fleshy part of the thigh was
considered a light sentence, whereas, "[a] heavy sentence could destroy bones and arteries." Id.
40. Id. at 85-86. One study indicated that 10% of kneecappings resulted in amputation, while one in
five victims were forced to walk with a limp for the rest of their lives. Id. at 86.






47. Id. at 86. It is possible for the victims of punishment attacks to receive government compensa-
tion as victims of a terrorist attack; however, any person who has ever been a member of a proscribed
organization like the PIRA is automatically ineligible for compensation. See id. at 46.
48. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 536.
49. Id.
50. See generally CONROY, supra note 2, at 67-106.
51. Id.
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addressed.56 As a precondition for participating in the peace talks, all parties had
to agree to the Mitchell Principles, 7 which required, among other things, the re-
nunciation of punishment killings and beatings. 58 During the actual peace nego-
tiations, both Irish Republican and British Loyalist paramilitaries continued to
carry out punishment attacks within their communities. 59 However, the commit-
ment by Sinn Fdin and Loyalist political parties to lean on their respective para-
military organizations was an important step in the cessation of punishment at-
tacks.6 1 Also, international political embarrassment and criticism from interna-
tional human rights organizations contributed to an atmosphere that made para-
military groups more willing to explore options for moving their organizations
away from punishment violence. 62 The Good Friday Agreement itself also set up
several bodies that had a direct effect on the criminal justice system.63 These
included a Human Rights Commission, an Equality Commission, a Sentence Re-
view Commission, an independent policing comnmission, and civil service review
of the criminal justice system.64
III. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND ITS USE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
A. Restorative Justice Defined
Restorative justice is defined as a system of dealing with conflicts, crime, and
anti-social behavior in a way that maximizes the involvement of the concerned
parties (offenders, victims, families, support networks, community representa-
tives, and justice professionals) in responding to the needs of victims, holding the
offenders accountable, and creating conditions for reducing and preventing further
56. See Stefan Wolff, Introduction: From Sunningdale to Belfast, 1973-98, in PEACE AT LAST?: THE
IMPACT OF THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT ON NORTHERN IRELAND, 133 (J6rg Neuheiser & Stefan
Wolff eds., Berghahn Books 2002).
57. The Mitchell Principles were developed by former United States Senator George Mitchell. In
1996, Mitchell was appointed as chairperson of the multi-party talks that led to the Good Friday
Agreement. ALvIN JACKSON, IRELAND 1798-1998: POLITICS AND WAR (Blackwell Publishers Inc.
1999).
58. See Wolff, supra note 56. The Mitchell Principles required that parties to the peace talks commit:
a. To democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; b. To the total
disarmament of all paramilitary organisations; c. To agree that such disarmament must be verify
able to the satisfaction of an independent commission; d. To renounce for themselves, and to op-
pose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the out-
come of all-party negotiations; e. To agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-
party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter
any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and, f. To urge that 'punishment' kill-
ings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.
Id. at 13 n. 9 (quotations omitted).
59. Id. at 31.
60. Sinn Fdin, literally meaning "ourselves alone," is the dominant Irish Republican political party in
Ireland. It was once considered to be one of the most militant nationalistic groups, but today it is con-
sidered the political wing of the IRA. CONROY, supra note 2, at 21-22.
61. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 537.
62. Id. at 537.
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harm.65 The concept of restorative justice can include a varied number of practic-
es, including conferencing, victim-offender mediation, sentencing circles, com-
munity reparation boards, restitution programs, and negotiation.
66
The goal of restorative justice is to reintegrate both victims and offenders
back into their communities by healing the harm caused and attempting to prevent
67its reoccurrence. For the victims of crime, restorative justice seeks to provide
them with justice that extends beyond what can be provided by the formal legal
system; instead, restorative justice aims to restore the victim's security, self-
respect, dignity, and sense of control. 68 For the offenders, restorative justice seeks
to hold them responsible for their behavior while simultaneously providing them
with a sense of control over how to make amends. 69 This process attempts to
instill in the offender a belief in the fairness of the processes that punished him.
70
At its most basic level, restorative justice involves an informal and private
process where the victims, offenders, and other interested groups meet with a
facilitator.7' Despite the participation of a facilitator, the voices of the stakehold-
ers dominate the discussions.72 The hope is that this informal, private process will
help create an environment that is both respectful and tolerant, where all partici-
pants feel comfortable speaking for themselves. 73  Restorative justice also in-
volves a great deal of flexibility in the process and the outcomes, though there are
rules to be followed and rights to be protected.74
The outcomes of a restorative justice process can vary widely. 75 Outcomes
are broadly defined as "whatever dimensions of restoration matter to the victims,
offenders and communities affected by the crime. 76 Outcomes can include apol-
ogies, reparations, community work, returning stolen property, compensating the
victims for injuries, or even serving a prison sentence.77 The only requirement for
an outcome to be considered "restorative" is that it is agreed upon and considered
appropriate by the parties involved.78 Therefore, the success of an outcome is
measured by the satisfaction of the stakeholders in each individual case. 79 Ideally,
restorative justice ends with reconciliation between the victim and the offender. 80
65. MIKA, supra note 9, at 1. Restorative justice has also been defined as, "a process whereby parties
with a stake in a specific offence collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and
its implications for the future." Andrew Ashworth, Responsibilities, Rights and Restorative Justice, 42
BRrT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 578 (Summer 2002).
66. Allison Morris, Critiquing the Critics, 42 BRIf. J. CRIMINOLOGY 596, 597 (2002).
67. Id. at 598.
68. Id. at 598-99.
69. Id. at 599.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Ashworth, supra note 65, at 578.
73. Morris, supra note 66, at 599.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Ashworth, supra note 65, at 578 (quotations omitted).
77. Morris, supra note 66, at 599.
78. Id.
79. Ashworth, supra note 65, at 578.
80. Morris, supra note 66, at 599. Examples include the victim inviting the offender over for dinner
with the victim's family, and in some cases, the victim showing up at the court hearing to speak on the
offender's behalf. Id. at 599-600.
[Vol. 2008
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There is no "right way" to administer restorative justice, and there is no require-
ment to adopt one form of restorative justice over another.8'
On some level, restorative justice is meant to replace government-sanctioned
criminal justice for a wide range of offenses.8 2 Restorative justice thus requires a
redefining of the concept of "criminal justice," away from the idea that it is a mat-
ter concerning only the offender and the state, and toward the idea that "criminal
justice" also includes the victim and the community as stakeholders in the out-
come.83 However, the typical criminal justice goals of protecting society and
making sure the "punishment fits the crime" are not precluded by a restorative
justice system. The difference is that in a restorative justice system, the offender,
victim, and community have more input, and ideally, more satisfaction with the
outcome. 84
B. CRJI and NIA
Prior to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, in 1996, Irish Republican
activists approached a group of human rights workers in Northern Ireland to begin
discussion and training on restorative justice issues.85 After consultation with
statutory organizations, community representatives, and political parties, the Re-
publican activists and human rights workers published a document entitled the
"Blue Book., 86 The "Blue Book" contained a proposed model for a system based
on restorative justice principles.8 7 This document was eventually endorsed by the
IRA and Sinn Fin.88 Following the publication of the Blue Book, and with fund-
ing from several philanthropic organizations, four CRJI pilot programs opened in
Irish Republican communities, and a NIA pilot project started in British Loyalist
areas.
89
The CRJI pilot programs offered basic restorative justice techniques like vic-
tim-offender mediation, family group conferencing, and monitoring agreements. 90
The NIA programs in Loyalist areas were limited to primarily providing an alter-
native to punishment violence for youthful offenders.9' This limitation is due in
large part to the UVF's stipulation that it would not use the restorative justice
program for internal paramilitary discipline, conflicts between paramilitary organ-
izations, and sexual or drug offenses. 92
In Irish Republican communities, CRJI urged community members to ap-
proach CRJI as an alternative to any cases where they previously would have
81. Id. at 600.
82. Ashworth, supra note 65, at 578.
83. Id.
84. Morris, supra note 66, at 599.
85. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 537.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Sinn Fdin made it clear that they did not view a restorative justice system as replacing the
formal justice system, however, emphasized that these restorative justice projects should not cooperate
with an unreformed RUC. Id.
89. Id.; see also, MIKA, supra note 9, at 4.
90. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 538.
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approached the IRA.93 The typical path of a restorative justice case in CRJI be-
gins with a referral to CRJI either by self-referral or referral by the victim or his
family, paramilitary groups, or any other community groups. 94 CRJI then deter-
mines whether the case is one covered by CRJI.95 Cases handled by CRJI range
from relatively minor cases of noise violations or property damage to more serious
disputes like threats of paramilitary attack.96 CRJI representatives then participate
in "shuttle diplomacy," where the project staff meets with the various affected
parties (the offender, the victim, the paramilitary groups, etc.) individually, often
at the parties' homes.97 If this shuttle diplomacy results in a resolution of the dis-
pute, then CRJI formalizes the agreement between all parties.98 If shuttle diplo-
macy fails to resolve the dispute, then CRJI arranges a more formal mediation or
conference involving all of the interested parties at a neutral site.99 The agree-
ments reached by CRJI and the parties can include apologies, agreements to des-
ist, return or replacement of items, monetary restitution, personal development
programs, and reintegration to the community.10 After the parties reach an
agreement, CRJI provides periodic monitoring of the agreement to ensure com-
pliance and provides support and intervention as needed.' 0' The case is finally
closed after CRJI ensures full compliance with the agreement.
0 2
A real-world situation provides a good example of CRJI work in action. A
group of teenagers committed more than sixteen break-ins in a neighborhood.,
0 3
Community residents who recognized the perpetrators approached the IRA to
recover the stolen items. 104 The IRA then contacted CRJI, which held a series of
meetings between the victims, the offenders, and their families.'0 5 These meetings
included twenty-one people. 10 6 In the end, the offenders agreed not to commit the
crimes again and promised to replace the stolen items and money; furthermore,
both the victims and offenders agreed not to retaliate against one another. 107 Last-
ly, the offenders' parents committed to encouraging their children to pursue more
positive goals.'
08
While restorative justice programs in both Republican and Loyalist communi-
ties are dedicated to resolving disputes in a way that addresses the concerns of
victims, offenders, and the public, there are some differences in how these pro-
93. Id. at 538.
94. MIKA, supra note 9, at 10.
95. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 538. Certain types of cases like domestic assault or child
abuse are typically referred to other organizations. Id.
96. Id. at 538-39. CRJI handles a large variety of cases including underage drinking, graffiti, stoning
of fire brigades, taxis, buses, and ambulances, desecration of churches, vandalism of local shops and
businesses, fighting, and joyriding. Id. at 539.
97. MIKA, supra note 9, at 10.
98. Id.
99. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 538.
100. MIKA, supra note 9, at 10.
101. Id.
102. Id. Data suggests that most cases are resolved very quickly, usually within forty-eight hours.
McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 538.
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grams are carried out. Generally speaking, the goal of CRJI is to negotiate a satis-
factory resolution of the specific dispute between the victim and offender. ° NIA
programs in Loyalist communities, on the other hand, focus much of their efforts
on rehabilitating wayward youths.' 1° Because of UVF-imposed limitations, most
of the clients for NIA are between thirteen and twenty-two years old."' Referrals
are made to NIA from paramilitary organizations, the offender or his family, or
other members of the community." 12 Once a referral is received, NIA staff contact
the UVF to verify the existence of a paramilitary threat and negotiate with the
UVF to lift the punishment threat against the offender if he successfully completes
the NIA program." 3 NIA representatives then meet with the offender and his or
her family to explain and discuss participation. 1 4 If the offender agrees to partic-
ipate in the restorative justice program, NIA then assigns the offender a casework-
er and works out a contract specifying remedial actions on offending behavior,
victim restitution, and community reparations.' 15 Similar to the CRJI agreements,
the NIA contracts can include apologies, agreements to desist, replacement of
items, monetary restitution, victim-offender conferences, volunteer work, and
personal development goals. 1 6 Throughout this process, NIA has contact with
victims, the offender's family, residents groups, and schools."
17
After the contract is formed, the youth offender makes a presentation to a
community panel that judges the adequacy of the contract terms." 8 The panel, the
offender, and NIA maintain regular contact thereafter."19 After several months,
the offender appears in front of the panel again to certify that the contract has been
successfully completed. 20 Subsequently, NIA provides support, after-care servic-
es, interventions, and referrals to other organizations as needed.1 2l
In one case, an area youth had been involved in a series of anti-social beha-
viors, including vandalism. 122 After repeated warnings from the UVF, and after
seriously damaging a local retiree's property, paramilitary punishment was set to
take place. 23 However, the case was referred to NIA, which assigned a case-
worker who worked out a contract with the youth.'2 4 The contract included apo-
logizing to the victim and fixing up his yard. 25 The youth also received assis-
109. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 539.
110. id.
111. Id.
112. MIKA, supra note 9, at 8.
113. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 539.
114. Id. If the offender decides not to participate in the program, NIA refers them to BASE 2. MIKA,
supra note 9, at 8. BASE 2 is a project sponsored by the Northern Ireland Association for the Care and
Resettlement of Offenders ("NIACRO"), which supports and relocates people under threat of paramili-
tary punishment. Id. at 8 n. 6. NIACRO also provided funding for the four CRJI pilot programs. McE-
voy & Mika, supra note 24, at 537.
115. Id. at 540.
116. MIKA, supra note 9, at 8.
117. Id.
118. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 540.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. MIKA, supra note 9, at 8.
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tance with his school work to help get him "back on track."' 126 The youth devel-
oped a relationship with the victim and even started running errands for him. 127
Both CRJI and NIA have had a dramatic impact on providing alternatives to
paramilitary punishment violence.' 28 One study showed that in all but one studied
area with a CRJI or NIA project, punishment beatings and shootings fell to ze-
ro. 129 In addition, both programs have since expanded to provide mediation and
conflict resolution services in situations that would not otherwise be resolved by
paramilitary violence. 1
30
CRJI and NIA demonstrate the flexibility of the concept of restorative justice
and that no method is the "correct" method. CRJI engages in shuttle diplomacy
between the individual parties, coordinating a meeting between them all when
necessary. NIA, on the other hand, works out a contract with the offender, with
the input of the victim, school groups, and the offender's family, which is then
approved by a panel of community members. These techniques vary widely, but
they are both considered restorative justice because they involve a resolution-
agreeable to the offender, the victim, and the community at large-that goes
beyond the normal criminal justice remedy of jail time.
V. CRITICISMS AND RESPONSE
Despite the apparent success of CRJI and NIA at decreasing the number of
punishment beatings in the areas where they are located, CRJI and NIA have not
been universally accepted. A number of criticisms have been made against these
restorative justice programs: that they are not truly voluntary, that they still leave
offenders subject to punishment from the criminal justice system, and that CRJI
and NIA are little more than fronts for allowing the IRA and UVF to assert more
control over their respective communities.'
A. Voluntary or Coercive?
Supporters of restorative justice criticize the traditional criminal justice sys-
tem as being coercive and repressive. 132 These supporters argue that because res-
torative justice requires cooperation, it cannot be coerced or imposed.133
Critics of CRJI and NIA, however, argue that the programs rely on either im-
plied or express coercion to force clients to take part in restorative justice.' 34
These critics, while acknowledging the superiority of voluntary agreements, argue
that restorative justice programs are not truly voluntary.' 35 Any perceived free-
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 540-41.
129. Id. at 541.
130. Id. at 540.
131. Davenport, supra note 16; CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 12,
at 3.
132. Margarita Zernova, Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Partici-
pants in Family Group Conferences, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 491, 500 (2007).
133. Id.
134. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 12, at 3.
135. Zernova, supra note 132, at 500.
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dom in restorative justice, they argue, must be qualified by enticements, threats,
and alternative courses of action.' 36 The idea of "choice" to participate in a res-
torative justice program must be evaluated in light of the fact that the decision not
to participate means dealing with the traditional criminal justice system. 37 In
Northern Ireland, the alternative to not participating in CRJI or NIA is often pa-
ramilitary retaliation. 138 Therefore, in a theoretical sense, the critics of restorative
justice are correct in saying that restorative justice is never as completely volunta-
ry as its supporters claim.
1 9
Moreover, coercion need not come from the state's criminal justice system;
coercion can come from a variety of sources.140 In Northern Ireland, the individu-
al's community places a large amount of coercive pressure on the individual.
141
Even though there is no evidence of physical coercion to motivate participation in
mediation or to make restitution, an offender is not as free to refuse restorative
justice, knowing that he must remain in his community, close to his victim and the
victim's relatives. 142 To some extent, however, an analysis of whether or not
community pressure makes these programs inherently coercive is irrelevant be-
cause the purpose of CRJI and NIA is not to exist independent of, or outside of,
these communal pressures. 143 Communal pressures had previously existed in the
form of IRA and UVF punishment attacks. 144 The purpose of CRJI and NIA is to
take over the functions of the paramilitary groups, to mediate these social pres-
sures and channel them in an acceptable, non-violent way.
45
B. Paramilitary Front?
Another criticism of CRJI and NIA is that they are little more than fronts for
the IRA and UVF, allowing these paramilitary organizations to exert more control
over their communities. 146 This suspicion flows from the assumption that if the
paramilitary groups support these projects, it must be because the projects allow
the paramilitary organizations to continue exerting control over their communi-
ties. 147 In fact, one group has suggested that, in some instances, people associated
with the restorative justice programs "use it as a cover for the exercise of paramili-
tary influence ... ,,148 The cynical interpretation is that the paramilitary groups
now use these restorative justice schemes to ensure that citizens continue coming
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 494.
139. See id. at 501.
140. Id.
141. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 12, at 8. The social pressure
exerted by a community can occasionally take tangible forms like ostracism, picketing, and breaking
windows, hardly better than paramilitary punishments. Id. at 8 n. 17.
142. Id. at 8-9.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 8 n.17.
146. Id. at 3.
147. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 546. This is a variation of the argument made about other
restorative justice programs allowing the state to exert more control over people. Id. at 545-46.
148. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 12, at 4.
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to them instead of the police.149 The more benign interpretation is that the in-
volvement of paramilitary groups in restorative justice schemes is the natural re-
sult of moving away from a world where violence was the principal means of law
enforcement.
150
While it would be difficult to create a system of restorative justice completely
free of any influence from the paramilitary groups that controlled neighborhoods
for so many years, in the years that CRJI and NIA have been operating, there have
been no reported instances of violence or threats against anyone working in res-
torative justice.1 5' Evidence of violence or threats by the paramilitary groups
against people in charge of the restorative justice projects would severely damage
the credibility of these projects.152
With wartime violence slowly becoming a thing of the past, paramilitary
members have begun to merge back into society. 53 In order to achieve a mandate
from the community, the restorative justice schemes must recruit from a cross-
section of all of the community's groups.' 54 It appears that the involvement of
paramilitary groups in CRJI and NIA is more a consequence of their formerly
large role in law enforcement than a conspiracy to maintain their hegemony. 55
Because violence is no longer a viable option, even if the paramilitaries are using
the CRJI and NIA to maintain power, it is surely a good sign that even the groups
responsible for punishment attacks are beginning to move away from the use of
violence. 156
C. Two Tiers of Justice?
Critics of CRJI and NIA also argue that these programs create a two-tiered
system of justice, leaving offenders subject to the criminal justice system. 157 CRJI
and NIA were originally created to replace the brutal system of paramilitary pu-
nishment that existed precisely because of a lack of effective law enforcement,
especially in Irish Republican communities. 58 Where the government was pre-
viously either unable or unwilling to prevent the paramilitary attacks and punish
the responsible parties, as CRJI and NIA have gained a reputation for reducing the
amount of punishment violence, the government has begun to take notice. 159
While CRJI and NIA are certainly better alternatives to no law enforcement, ques-
tions remains about what role these programs will play once police are available




151. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 546.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 546-47.
154. Id. at 547.
155. See id.
156. Id.
157. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 12, at 3; Davenport, supra note
16.
158. McEvoy & Mika, supra note 24, at 536.
159. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 12.
160. Id. at 10.
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Several government policies make the existence of completely independent
restorative justice schemes difficult. First is the Criminal Law Act of 1967, which
makes it a crime for people with material information about a crime to fail to re-
port it to the police.' 6' Another obstacle is the unwillingness of the government to
concede its law enforcement power to these restorative justice groups. The gov-
ernment of Northern Ireland has stated that restorative justice programs will not
operate in Northern Ireland outside of the involvement of the Police Service of
Northern Ireland ("PSNI"). 16  Thus CRJI and NIA would take their cases on re-
ferral from the police service instead of taking cases directly from members of
their own communities-a directive to which CRJI objects. 163
The government has legitimate concerns about CRJI and NIA acting as in-
termediaries between the citizens and the police force. 164 The existence of such an
intermediary could lead to certain information about crimes not getting to the
police, despite the terms of the Criminal Law Act of 1967.165 It is likely that in
some cases, especially in Irish Republican communities where distrust of the po-
lice has been the norm for many years, Catholic residents would simply not report
the criminal activity to the police in the first place.
166
The government has also realized, however, that these restorative justice
schemes serve a very useful purpose within their communities. 167 Imposing ex-
ternal government regulations on these community-based schemes could have
negative consequences.' 68 It is in recognition of these competing interests that the
government has recommended that CRJI and NIA be allowed to operate, but un-
der a system of supervision and monitoring. 169 To this end, the British govern-
ment has instituted a system of accreditation for the restorative justice programs
under a series of protocols. 7 °  Under the protocols, all criminal offenses are
passed by the police to the Public Prosecution Service.' 7 1 The Public Prosecution
161. Id. at 5-6. Section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act reads:
Where a person has committed an arrestable offence, it shall be the duty of every person who
knows or believes 1. that the offence or some other arrestable offence has been committed and 2.
that he has information that is likely to be of material assistance in securing the apprehension,
prosecution or conviction of any person for that offence to give that information within a reason-
able time to a constable and if, without a reasonable excuse, he fails to do so then that person is
committing an offence.
Id.
162. Media Centre, Police involvement in restorative justice schemes is non negotiable - Hanson,
Northern Ireland Office (Nov. 2, 2005) available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/media-
detail.htmnewslD= 12456. "There is absolutely no question of the Government approving [communi-
ty-based restorative justice] schemes without the involvement of the PSNI .... The Government will
not approve a two tier system of justice." Id. (quoting Criminal Justice Minister, David Hanson, MP).
163. See Davenport, supra note 16.
164. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSPECTION NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 12, at 11.
165. Id.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 10.
168. See id.
169. id.
170. Media Centre, Accreditation for community based restorative justice schemes, Northern Ireland
Office (Aug. 3, 2007) available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/accreditation-for-community-based-
restorative-justice-schemes/media-detail.htm?newslD= 14578.
171. Criminal Justice System Northern Ireland, Protocol for Community-based Restorative Justice
Schemes (Feb. 5, 2007) available at
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Service then refers certain low-level offenses to the proper restorative justice pro-
gram for resolution. 172 Not all restorative justice groups have accepted the proto-
cols to become accredited and receive public financing. Therefore, these groups
are not bound to receive cases directly from the police and may still receive cases
from community members and paramilitary organizations. 1
73
Still, the fact that collaboration now exists between state prosecution efforts
and restorative justice programs suggests that there is widespread belief that these
programs play an integral role in dispute resolution.
V. CONCLUSION: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Paramilitary violence has essentially disappeared in the regions of Northern
Ireland in which CRJI and NIA have been operating. As such, it could be said
that the programs have essentially fulfilled their original purpose of creating an
alternative to punishment attacks, a new form of social control and criminal jus-
tice. With paramilitary attacks increasingly unacceptable, restorative justice pro-
grams will have to adapt to remain a relevant and useful part of a legitimate crim-
inal justice system. To that end, both CRJI and NIA will have to find a way to
coexist with the traditional criminal justice system of Northern Ireland, which for
many years was essentially non-existent. If CRJI and NIA want to remain viable
in the future, some changes should be made.
The stipulation by the UVF that it will not use restorative justice for internal
paramilitary discipline, conflicts between paramilitary organizations, and sexual
or drug offenses has restricted the NIA to functioning only in the limited area of
juvenile offenses. If NIA is to be more effective, the UVF should drop these limi-
tations, thereby allowing NIA to take on a wider range of cases. With paramilita-
ry violence becoming less and less acceptable, it is likely that the UVF will make
such a compromise.
It is possible for restorative justice schemes to carve out a niche for resolving
low-level offenses, for which the PSNI lacks the resources to remedy. The accre-
ditation system currently in place appears to be a good first step to integrating
restorative justice schemes into a formal system of criminal justice. The imple-
mentation of a referral system should be able to adequately address the concerns
of the government regarding a two-tiered justice system, while simultaneously
maintaining a role for restorative justice programs in resolving some low-level
criminal activity. Also, because the protocol, by its terms, does not apply to anti-
social behavior that does not reach a criminal level, restorative justice programs




172. Id. The schemes are, however, forbidden from handling sexual or domestic offenses, or from
handling any criminal matter not referred from the Public Prosecution Service. Id. To date, only five
chapters of NIA have achieved accreditation. See Register of Community-Based Restorative Justice
Schemes (Aug. 1, 2008) available at
http://www.nio.gov.uk/register ofaccreditedcommunity-based-restorativejusticeschemes.pdf.
173. See Davenport, supra note 16.
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The accreditation and protocol system could, however, pose some problems.
CRJI and NIA are local programs created to deal with disputes in the best way for
their communities. There is some concern that requiring all activity to pass
through a formal government agency before reaching one of the programs could
blunt the efficiency and effectiveness of the local programs. It will be necessary
to eventually reexamine the work of CRJI and NIA in order to determine how they
are functioning under the new government system and if any changes need to be
made. The government will thus need to be open to reforming the protocols as
needed to enhance the effectiveness of restorative justice programs. For now,
however, the protocols should be an acceptable way of integrating CRJI and NIA
into the formal criminal justice system of Northern Ireland.
Restorative justice has served and continues to serve a vital function in
Northern Ireland-resolving disputes without resorting to the violent regime of
paramilitary law enforcement that existed for many years. It remains to be seen
what role these restorative justice groups will play as Northern Ireland continues
to move from kneecappings toward peace.
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